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Exchange Rates in Portugal 1973-78 
A Portfolio Model of an Inconvertible Currency 
Jorge Braga de.Macedo* 
Introduction 
The flexible exchange rate regime that has prevailed atoong industrial 
countries for most of the decade has been accompanied by a continuing 
increase in interdependependence, in particular through international financial 
intermediation. In such an environment, toost open, semi-industrialized, 
economies have found it difficult to either remain pegged to a major cur­
rency or float. This has probably reinforced the authorities' attempts to 
restrict the access to the foreign exchange market for capital account and 
even for current account transactions. 
In other words, the currencies of these countries have in general 
remained inconvertible. This does not imply that the authorities have 
complete control over the price of foreign currency. Exchange rate policy 
has, indeed, become more difficult to enforce than it was under fixed rates. 
To begin with, pegging to one major currency means floating relative to 
other major currencies. More importantly for our purposes, the geographical 
domain of high capital 100bility has widened, so that the inconvertibility 
of the domestic currency generates stronger incentives for the development 
* Lecturer, Department of Economics and Economic Growth Center, Yale 
University. This paper extends and revises Section III.3 of Essay III of 
my Ph.D. dissertation. I am grateful to the members of my committee, in 
particular to Albert Fishlow, for encouraging further thought on the topic. 
Errors are my own. 
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of a "parallel" foreign exchange market and a "black market" exchange 
rate. 
Aside from the enforcement aspect, exchange rate policy in this 
context is also more difficult to understand conceptually because models 
of the balance of payments relying on the assumption of a fixed (official) 
price of foreign currency are as inadequate as models of freely flexible 
rates. 
The conventional monetary model of the exchange rate is particularly 
inadequate when the lack of availability of domestic assets other than 
money encourages domestic residents to diversify their financial portfolios 
by holding foreign assets. 
The portfolio approach to flexible exchange rates, on the other hand, 
assumes a fairly sophisticated financial structure which can be reduced to 
two moneys when the country is financially underdeveloped. Furthermore, 
when the central bank varies the official exchange rate according to some 
set of discretionary rules and at the same time has an extended control 
over the official foreign exchange market, the determination of the black 
market rate by portfolio equilibrium, which takes the official rate as given 
at each instant of time has to be adapted in order to incorporate the 
' 
linkages between the two markets. 
In this paper a two country portfolio balance model is developed, 
drawing on the extension of the Tobin (1969) framework to the open economy 
and in particular on the Kouri (1975) approach to flexible exchange rates 
as extended to two countries in Kouri-Macedo (1978). The model incorporates 
inflation in both countries along the lines suggested in Kouri (1978) 
t 
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and is extended to a situation of currency inconvertibility along the 
lines suggested in Macedo (1979b). 
The model yields an estimable.equation for the black market rate, 
which is contrasted with the monetarist approach to flexible exchange rates 
using the same expectations formation mechanism. The estimated equation 
also provides a test on whether the reaction function used to set the of-
fical exchange rate in inspired on relative purchasingpowerparity considerations. 
The model is tested using quarterly data on the black market rate of 
the Portuguese escudo against the U.S. dollar from 1973;i when the Bank of 
Portugal ceased to defend the Smithsonian parity of the escudo, to 1979;1, 
the last quarter of the standby agreement with the IMF, and also the 
latest available data. 
To test a model over a period where the economy experienced 
severe external and internal real shocks and also several changes in exchange 
rate policy involves a strong maintained hypothesis that the basic mechanism 
at work can be captured econometrically, since various out-of-sample fore­
casts suggest structural breaks. But the overall fit and the 
precision of the estimates of the complete model and a simplified version 
thereof are sufficiently remarkable to warrant the use of models 
of this type in analyzing exchange rate determination in semi-industrialized 
economies with inconvertible currencies. 
The paper is divided into two sections, followed by a brief 
conclusion and a data appendix. Section I contains the model and Section 
II the empirical results. Before starting the analysis, we summarize the 
macroeconomic adjustment process in Portugal over the last five years. 
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After the March 1973 decision the escudo was allowed to revalue 
against the dollar. In the Fall, however, the "oil crisis" increased the 
foreign currency price of imports a~d, despite substantial nominal wage 
increases in 1974 and 1975, the price of nontraded goods in terms of imports 
did not increase until 1976. This was due not only to the pegging of the 
exchange rate but also to the increase in the real wage. Both deteriorated 
the current account and led to a loss in reserves that was not offset by 
domestic credit creation until 1976. 
After some attempts in the first half of 1976, an active policy of 
depreciation was initiated with an 18 percent effective devaluation in 
February 1977. This led to an increase in prices and a decline in the 
real wage, but the credit to the government and the external deficit 
continued to increase. Despite another effective devaluation of 4 percent 
in late August, followed by the announcement of a crawling peg to a basket 
currencies, at the rate of 1 percent per month on an average, the current 
account continued to worsen until mid 1978 •. At the same time, domestic 
credit expansion--often used. for the stockpiling of foreign goods--was 
leading to a further drain in reserves, and made extra financing inevitable. 
A stand-by agreement with the IMF was thus concluded on May 5 1978, 
whereby the escudo was devalued by 7 percent, interest rates were substantial­
ly increased and the rate of crawl was established at 1.25 percent per month. 
The.current and capital accounts quickly improved in the following quarters 
and the rate of crawl was back to 1 percent in April 1979. However, the 
deficit of the public sector in 1979 could be as high as $2.2 billion, 
leaving doubts about the duration of the improvement in external balance 
if public finances are not brought under control. 
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1. The Model 
1. Consider a world of two countries who trade goods as well as 
non-interest bearing financial assets, money for short. 1 Private 
financial wealth in both countries is thus divided between domestic and 
foreign ooney. The real asset demand functions have as arguments the 
expected change in the real exchange rate, which captures the return 
differential; domestic real output, which captures the transactions needs 
and real financial wealth. 
This two-way currency substitution model ca~ be written as follows 
eFd - + eF(1) p - f(w,
+ y A) a:-p 
+Md M(2) p =m (ir' +Y, A) = -p 
T
(3) AP - w - M - G + eF 
Gd -* .,. __G(4) - g ('Ir, y , A*) 
eP* eP* 
+Hd +* +* H(5) - h ('Ir, y , A ) a: - * p* p 
* * * T(6) A p - w - H - F + G/e 
where e is the domestic currency price of foreign currency 
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* P(P) is the domestic (foreign) price level 
w is the expected rate of change in e • eP*/P, the real exchange rate r 
A(A)* is domestic (foreign) private real wealth 





is the domestic (foreign) money stock 
M(H) is the domestic (foreign)money stock held by domestic (foreign) 
residents 
F(G) is the foreign (domestic) m:>ney stock held by domestic (foreign) 
residents, denominated in foreign (domestic) currency. 
The signs over the arguments of the assets demand functions refer 
to their partial derivatiy~s. 
2 If domestic residents are not net debtors in 
foreign currency, F
d 
> 0 and an expected depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency increases the demand for foreign assets by domestic residents and 
decreases the demand for domestic as~ets Ly foreign residents, with a 
decrease in the demand for domestic assets by domestic residents and an 
increase in the demand for foreign assets by foreign residents of the same 
amount. For example 
f = - m 
n n 
An increase in real wealth at home or abroad is distributed 
among the two assets so that, for example 
By (1) and (4) the desired net nominal capital outflow in foreign 
·d .d 
curreny, F - G /e, is always equal to the actual capital outflow. Thus, 
substituting (3) in (1) and (6) in (4), differentiating the asset demand 
functions and rearranging, we get an expression for the nominal capital 
outflow corrected for capital gains and losses as a function of the 
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proportioul rate of real appreciation, th
e proportional chane@ in thP 
real money stocks and real outputs at home





* T ,. 
- e [F (1 - fA) + .2. (1 - gA)] + fA !:!e Mr e 
where a hat {A) over a variable denotes a proport
i onal change, 
f = of/ax denotes the partial derivative 
of function f with respect 
X 
to argument x 
f 
n = If Ix f denotes the (positive) elas
ticity of function f with 
X X 
respect to argument x 
M = 1l/P 
Balance of payments accounting implies tha
t the difference between 
the real excess supply of foreign currency 
from the currency account 
surplus and the real excess demand for for
eign currency implied by the 
real capital outflow has to be equal to th
e real change in the stock of 
foreign assets of the central bank or 
. . .!G
(8) B F • G/er - F 
8 
where F • F/P* 
G = G/P 
FG a FG/p* is the real stock of foreign assets of the 
central bank 
Bis the real current account surplus expressed in foreign 
currency. 
From (8) the nominal current account, net of changes in the stock of 
foreign assets of the central bank corrected for capital gain_s due to 




Substituting for the right hand side from (7), we get the net 
current account as a function of the determinants of the net capital 
outflow, and solving for the change in the real exchange rate we obtain 
/, n, :G _G.:*. * \,.LU/ e -" - (BP - r· + r· .t' ) (ir fA gA)iI 
* + fAµ M - gA \I H - 4iY n + 4iY*4iy* + Il'IT 
A 
where I= F(l - fA) + eG (1 - gA) * is the gross level of foreign investment 





♦ --el T) y * 
If I> 0, which would not occur if domestic residents were debtors 
in foreign currency, we see that the real exchange rate depreciates with 
real money growth at home and appreciates with real money growth abroad, 
whilst it appreciates with real output growth at home and depreciates 
with real output growth abroad. An increase in the expected rate of 
depreciation of the real rate also depreciates the real rate. Given the 
elasticities of the asset demand functions with respect ton, the co­
efficient on n will be smaller the higher the wealth effects fA and 
gA.* The effects of output growth are also less than the respective 
elasticities. 
The critical condition can be seen in the coefficient of the 
first term. A net current account surplus will be associated with a 
real appreciation of the exchange rate if the "transfer condition" 
holds, or 
This implies that the domestic wealth-induced increase in the 
demand for domestic assets by domestic residents (mA • 1 ~ fA )has to 
be larger than the foreign wealth-induced increase in the demand for 
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*domestic assets by foreign residents (gA), or alternatively that 
* hA • 1 - gA > fA. When the level of gross foreign investment is positive 
(I> 0), the stability condition is thus that domestic currency is the 
"Preferred mnetar:' hahitat". 3 
Under stationary expectations (n ~ 0), equation (10) provides a 
complete description of the determination of the change in the real 
exchange rate. If the d d fepen ence o the real current account on relative 
_prices is made explicit, the "transfer condition" is supplemented by an 
"elasticities condition" and the long run value of the real exchange is 
such that the real net Rtock of foreign assets is constant and there is no 
intervention • 
2. To adapt equation (10) to a regime of currency inconvertibility 
where there are continuous changes in the official exchange rate, as well 
as in the reserves of the central bank, we first need to specify how 
these affect the expected rate of change of the black market real exchange 
rate. 
One simple and plausible specification of n is that it is a negative 
function of the black market premium and the stock of central bank reserves. 
If the official rate depreciates the black market rate depreciates 
as well but if the black market rate depreciates given the official rate, 
then it is expected to appreciate. This is, of course, equivalent to 
assuming extrapolative expectations with respect to the real official 
rate and regressive expectations with respect to the real black market 
rate. The assumption of the same elasticity is merely a matter of con­
venience. 
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If reserves go up, the real black market exchange rate will be 
expected to appreciate. One could argue that it could equally well 
depreciate because, at a given supply, there is a greater demand for foreign 
assets by domestic residents, including the central bank. The mechanism 
present in equation (10) is that an increase in real reserves increases the 
actual rate of real depreciation, in' the same way that an expected ap-
preciation (from the increase in F)
G 
would. The argument about the direct 
effect of changes in FG on expectations is, however, that in a regime where 
there is intervention and administrative exchange rate changes in the 
official market, the strength of the currency in that market has an effect 
on the expected rate of change in the real black market rate. The assump­
tion is that this effect occurs in both the premium and central bank 
reserves and the irrelevance of valuation changes on central bank reserves 
for monetary policy suggests that the nominal stock should be used. 
In sum we postulate a wfunction of the form 
(11) 
where p = e/e is the black market premium. 
Changes in nominal central bank reserves do have an effect on the 
rate of growth of the domestic nominal money stock, assuming away the foreign 
central bank. In fact, the domestic money stock is defined at 
MT• C + eFG - K 
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where C is domestic credit of the banking system to the private sector 
and K is the net worth of the banking system. 
Assuming that official foreign exchange reserves are not affected 
either by changes in valuation deriving from official exchange rate changes, 
the sources of domestic money growth are given by 
(12) 
where D = C is domestic credit creation by the banking system. 
Substituting (12) and the log differential of (11) into (10) and 
collecting terms we get an expression for the proportional rate of change 
in the black market rate. 









µ c M /el 
T -
v = H /1 
f 1T * g 1Tl • F(l-fA + Tl,r Tip) + Q (1 - gA + Tl,r Tip)e 
d s D/MT - P 
* and e = (f /e + g /p) nFG - (1 - f - g ) - f /p,r r ,r A A A 
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It is useful to collect the terms arising from the behavior of 
DDnetary authorities as defined in an "exchange rate pressureII vari able4 
which is positive whenever either the official rate depreciates 
(e > 0) or the central bank looses reserves (FG < 0) and negative when
·cthe official currency is "strong" (e < 0 or F > 0). The size of the 
pressure as measured increases with the premium and the strenght of the 
expectations effects. Aside from the effects of the growth in the real 
domestic credit and the foreign DDney stock, which are given by the 
wealth propensities weighted by the ratio of the stocks to the level of 
international investment adjusted for expectations (I), and the effects 
of real output growth at home and abroad, which are given by the income 
elasticites of money demand weighted by the ratio of the assets and 
liabilities, respectively, and I, equation (13) implies that, both when 
r,e >0 and I,0< 0 the effect of official exchange market pressure will be 
to depreciate the black market rate. Also, if the transfer condition holds 
and I> 0 the current acrount will he ne~Rtivelv related to the black market 
premium, that is to say that will be positively related to the official 
exchange rate. 
In fact, taking the official real exchange rate as given and assuming 
that the real current account depends only on the black market premium, 
we find from taking a linear approximation to (13) around equilibrium 
when p • 1 that 
p 
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where Bis the long run real current account and Z are the exogenous 
variables in (13). 
If the increase in the premium deteriorates the real current account 
and < 0 a deficit will be associated with an increase in the premium, 
and, e > 0 a decline in foreign exchange reserves will be associated 
with an increase in the premium. In a more detailed analysis, the 
"true" current account could be dfvided into a reported component, where 
b > O 5n . Since we only _n! < 0 and an unreported current account~. where p 
' observe the reported current account, there is a possibility that the 
negative elasticity will overtake the "transfer condition". 
Another feature of (13) above is that real official exchange rate 
depreciation reduces the black market premium directly rather than via 
the gain in competitiveness. The effect has an upper bound of 1, when 
the expectations elasticities in I are negligible. If official 
exchange rate policy is based on a PPP rule, e = 0 and the real exchanger 
rate does not affect the black market premium, which is then defined as 
the departure of the black market rate from relative PPP. 
Before proceeding to estimate equation (13) in the case of the 
escudo-dollar rate, it should be emphasized how the condition of 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market that underlies the equation 
differs from the monetarist approach to exchange rate flexibility. There, in fact, 
perfect goods arbitrage fixes the real exchange rate and thus makes the 
change in the nominal rate a function of "excessive" monetary growth
6 
at 
home and abroad. 
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Using (2) and (5) above, ignoring the wealth effects and using 
(11) and (12), we obtain a monetarist alternative to (13) as: 
- ·c
-y* "* _ eF(14) e ,.. e + 1 [d - H - ;y y + n - e ] 8T+,l ' r M p h ,r
where .Tl - (n: + Tl,r) np 
:y eF f 
"' "' - M Tly 
-y* . G g
♦ = eH Tly* 
and e = (fn/er - e: p g,r)P*n FG - 1 
Note that we have substituted for the partials using Tobin's laws, 
so that we could use the same elasticities as in (13). 
Even though the expectation formation mechanism used in (13) and 
(14) is not in the monetarist tradition, and the relative opportunity 
costs of holding 100ney are generally solved out for the forward premium, the 
crucial difference of no trade in money is,of course, the irrelevance of 
the current account, and the strong proposition that, except for the 
expectations elasticity term, there is a coefficient of 1 ford and H. 
In the next section we do not explicitly test the two alternative 
specificatiortl, but in the process of estimating (13) the relevance of 
the portfolio approach will clearly emerge. 
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2. Estimation 
The main difficulty in estimating equation (13) has to do with 
the absence of data on black market transactions. It is believed that 
the reported current account of Portugal includes, via underinvoicing of 
exports and overinvoicing of imports. unauthorized capital flows and also 
that there was substantial capital flight during the period. The use of 
the reported current account net of change in the foreign assets of the 
banking system, while it underestimates the total capital account insofar 
as the exclusion of the faked current account transactions and capital 
flight is concerned, overestimates it insofar as foreign direct investment 
and long term capital account transactions of the public sector are included. 
Also there are no gross data on short term private capital flows, so that 
the use of the series on private long term capital outflows to generate 
the stock of foreign assets does not allow for short term borrowing in 
foreign currency by the private sector, even though this is believed to 
7have taken place. 
We therefore decided to take the ratios involving the stocks of 
foreign asset and liabilities of the private sector as parameters. 
We then have as independent variables in the regression of the change 
in the end of period black market rate in percent per quarter (series 20 in 
the Appendix) the change in the end of period official rate (series 18) 
the change in the real end of period official rate (series 19), the changes 
in industrial production in Portugal (series 21) and the U.S. (series 22) 
as proxies for real incomes, all in percent per quarter, domestic credit 
creation as a proportion of the money supply less the domestic rate of 
inflation (series 24A real money growth in the U.S. (series 23~ the current 
17 
account (series 27) and the capital gains and losses on the stock of 
foreign assets of the banking system due to U.S. inflation (series 29) both 
as a proportion of the 100ney supply valued at the black market rate, and 
the balance on non-monetary transactions as a proportion of the money supply 
valued at the official rate as the "foreign monetary base" (series 25) .. 
The constant in the regression can be interpreted as the unreported current 
account. 
The results of the estimation of this equation with quarterly data 
using ordinary least squares can be found in Table 1. 
The fit is reasonable, with over 2/3 of the variance of the change 
in the black market rate explained by the regressors. There is, however, 
some negative autocorrelation in the residuals and the significance level 
of the F test is almost 1 percent. The effects of the official rate, credit 
creation and domestic output growth are quite precisely estimated and, given 
F, I, I> 0, with the expected sign. The real official rate is also of the 
expected sign but a slightly higher significance level. Foreign money and 
output growth, together with capital gains and the constant are insignifi­
cant and of the wrong sign. 
The negative sign of the foreign monetary base would then be an 
indication that the expectation effect was stronger than the crowding out 
effect. However, the positive sign of the reported current account suggests 
that the surplus, by showing less disguissed capital outflows, is associated 
with an increase in the price of foreign currency, rather than with the 
expected decrease. The reported current account does, as pointed out above, 
depend negatively on the level of the black market rate in the model of 
inconvertibility emphasizing this distinction. 
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Table 1 
Estimation of Equation (13) 
By Ordinary Least Squares 
Quarterly Data 1973;1 - 1979;1 
Variable number and Mean Auxiliary 
Name in the Appendix Coefficient Standard error t statistic of variable R2 
Constant 2. 743 4.385 .626 1 .88 
26. CABMR 5. 714 1.676 3.409 -1.346 .79 
29. KLNFAM2 -7.790 6.895 -1.130 .249 -.46 
18. GOMEB 3.117 1.277 2.442 2.578 .97 
25. FMBB -3.539 1.059 -3. 343 -1.045 .62 
24. RDCITM2 2.452 1.004 2.443 .030 .85 
23. GRM2US .790 .909 .869 .074 .63 
19. GROMEB -2.299 1.279 1. 797 -.642 .97 
21. GIP -2.503 .939 -2.665 1.285 .58 
22. GIPUS -.458 . 728 -.630 .84 7 .42 
20. GBMER 2.854 
R2 = • 71 R
2 adjusted for degrees of freedom= .54 
Durbin-Watson Statistic= 2.21 
Standard error of the regression = 7 .65 
F statistic (9, 15) = 4.1813 significance level-= .7% 
Note: Variables 18 through 22 are expressed in percent per quarter. The other 
variables are expressed as a percentage of the previous period money stock, 
valued at the black market rate, for series 26 and 29, at the official rate for 
series 25 and in domestic currency for series 24. See Data appendix for details. 
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Furthermore, the fact that domestic real money growth has the 
expected sign shows tha~ if I< 0 and the private sector is net debtor in 
foreign currency, then we need to have F
d 
~ 0 as well and therefore fA < 0. 
If we ignore gA,* the ratio of the coefficients on the current accotmt and 
domestic credit creation gives an estimate of fA sinceµ cancels. The 
number implied by the coefficients is in fact negative and in the rate of 
-.97 to -.23, with a point estimate of -.75. This implies that domestic 
residents are debtors in foriegn currency and want to borrow in foreign 
currency roughly 3/4 of the increase in their real wealth and that the 
expectations effects are also reversed, which explains why the coefficient 
on the real exchange rate is greater than one in absolute value (jij < III). 
The size of the sign on the nominal official exchange rate can only be ex­
plained by the rather pronounced multicollinearity, in particular with the 
real rate. 
The autocorrelation is corrected for in Table 2, and even though 
there is some decline in the value of the coefficients, the significance 
*remains and the fit improves. The implied values for fA (still with gA = 0) 
have a range between -1.45 and -.45, with a point estimate of -1.22. 
Strictly speaking, this value is incompatible with a two asset ioodel inso­
far as it could imply negative wealth in the steady-state. 
A plot of the actual and fitted values from the regression in 
Table 1 can be found in Figure 1. Even though the fit is better with the 
autocorrelation correction, the interpretation of the plot is easier using 
the undifferenced data. The drops in the black market rate in 1973; 1; 
1973;3; 1975;2 and 1976;1 are not captured by the ioodel. The drops in 
1973 are related to the appreciation of the official rate against the dollar 
after the devaluation of early March. The drop of 1975;2, just before the 
sample maximum of the "Hot Sumner" of 1975; 3 can be explained by the 
fact that the deterioration of the current account following the March 11 
20 
Table 2 
Estimation of Equation (13) Correcting for First Order Autocorrelation 
Quarterly data 1973;1 - 1979;1 
Variable number and 
Name in the Appendix Coefficient Standard error t statistic 
Constant 2.614 3.600 . 727 
CABMR 4.640 1.504 3.086 
KLNFAM2 -6 .377 5.450 -1.170 
GOMEB 3.024 1.091 2.773 
FMB -2.473 .915 -2.703 
RDUTM2 2.554 .916 2.788 
GRM2US .630 1.115 .565 
GROMEB -2.188 1.141 -1.917 
GIP -2.881 .827 -3.483 
GIPUS -.094 .633 -.148 
GBMER 
RHO -.422 .033 
2R- = .73 
2R- !!I~.; 11C'!t-orl11.4-J--""-- for degrees ,., f'..., .. freedom ~ c:;, • J I 
Durbin Watson statistic= 2.10. 
Standard error of the regression= 7.38. 
F statistic (9.15) = 4.52 significance level= .5 percent. 
Residual Mean= -.049. 
Note: Statistics are for differenced data from Table 1. 
Mean Auxiliary 
of variable R2 
1.401 .92 
-1.915 .85 
• 353 .59 
3.603 .96 
-1.494 • 72 
.094 .85 
.196 .58 
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leftist coup, led to further restrictions on capital outflows and the levy­
ing of an import surcharge in May. Thus the capital outflow declined in 
1975;2 but during 1975;3 it reached over one billion dollan (from $.3 
billion),whilst the current account deficit declined from $230 million 
to $70 million. In 1976; 1 the black market rate fell by about 16 percent 
as the political situation stabilized. The official rate began to be actively 
devalued (15 percent in the two quarters), however, and the black market 
rate increased 9 percent in 1976;2. 
The increases in 1977;3 and 1978;2 are also underestimated by the 
model, since,given its enormous size, the increase of 1975;3 is fairly 
well predicted. The black market rate increased in the first quarter of 
1977 but the premium declined. After the announcement of the crawling 
peg, however, the premium went up to 10 percent in 1977; 3 and 20 percent 
in 1977;4, also helped by the fact that the offical rate was lower due to 
the fall of the dollar in late 1977. In 1978;1 despite further deteriora-
ton in the current account, the black market rate declined by 13 percent 
to jump up again by 10 percent in the second quarter, possibly because 
the agreement with the IMF in May, whilst raising domestic interest rates 
substantially, discontinued forward cover by the central bank. Between 
these two quarters the current and the capital account reversed fro~ a 
deficit of $410 and $184 million resnectiv~ly t~ a ~~all surplus a~~ an 
inflow of $400 million respectively. 
That the adoption of the crawling peg and the agreement with the 
IMF involved structural changes in the Portuguese foreign exchange markets 
is confirmed by the out-of-sample forecasts reported in Tables3 and 4. 
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In Table 3, the model is estimated using ordinary least squares from 
1973;1 to 197Z~2 in column A and from 1973; 1 to 1978; 1 in column~ and 
used to predict the remaining values. The regression coefficients are quite 
sensitive to the period 1977;3 to 1978;1: for the current account, the 
nominal rate, the "foreign monetary base" and the real rate, the drop in 
absolute value is about one. The underprediction of the increase in the 
black market rate is substantial in both cases, and the root mean square 
error is respectively 5 and 5.4 times the actual mean. The higher value 
of the Theil inequality coefficient in column B confirms that there was 
a new break in 1978. 
Correcting for autocorrelation, as in Table 4, and using the sample 
autocorrelation coefficient in the forecast, actually increases the root 
mean square error and the Theil U in the first experiment, probably due to 
the increase in the DW after first order negative serial correlation is 
corrected for. The results in column Bare only marginally better than 
with 0LS and we therefore, report in Figure 2 the fitted values over the 
whole sample period from Table 1 together with the in and out of sample 
forecasts from column A and B of Table '3. 
The fitted values are not too different from each other until the 
devaluation quarter, 1977; 2, but the forecast for the crawling peg 
period severely underestimates the black market rate. Thus a decline of 
the fitted value is 10.2 percent and 2.7 percent is predicted for 1977;3, 
whilst there was a 14.4 percent actual increase. Similarly, the devaluation 
of 1978;2 is not captured either and a decline of 9.8 percent is predicted 























Forecasts from Table 1 
A B 
1973;1 - 1977;2 1973;1 -
Coefficient St. Error t Coefficient 
-13.28 8.58 -1.55 -7.66 
5.96 2.30 2.59 4. 77 
12. 74 11.70 1.09 6. 77 
4.52 1. 74 2.60 3.57 
-5.60 1.42 -3.96 -4.63 
2.98 1.48 2.01 3.14 
.66 1.61 .41 -.07 
-3.87 1.77 -2.18 -3.00 
2.50 1.14 -2.27 2.24 







1977;3 - 1979;1 1978;2 -
-12.60 -10.06 
3.52 4.52 
17 .40 15.42 
1.95 2.69 
1978:1 




1.29 2. 77 
1.18 -3.92 
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* - * fitted values from Table 1 
0 --- 0 fitted values form Table 3 column A 
0 -.- 0 forecastsfrom Table 3 column A 
# •.. # fitted values from Table 3 column B 
# -.- # forecasts from Table 3 column B 
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Table 4 
Forecasts from Table 2 
A B 
1973·1. - 1977·2. 1973·1. - 1978·1, 
K:oefficient St. Error t Coefficient St. Error t 
Constant -19.297 6.807 -2.834 -9.242 6.419 -1.440 
CABMR 4 .477 1.394 3.212 3.307 1.661 1.991 
KLNFAM2 18.078 7.878 2.295 8.943 8.904 1.004 
GOMEB 5.399 1.197 4.509 3.702 1.154 3.208 
FMB -4.829 950 -5.084 -3.425 .998 -3 .433 
RDCITM2 3.956 1.120 3.533 3.575 1.102 3.245 
GRM2US -1.304 1.951 -.668 -.669 1.558 - .429 
GROMEB -5.033 1.367 -3.683 -3.249 1.287 -2.525 
GIP -2.886 . 714 -4.042 -2.583 .836 -3.089 
GIPUS .551 .551 1.000 .363 .652 .556 
RHO -. 776 .022 
R2 (adj. df) .91 (.81) .82 ( .67) 
Durbin Watson 2.89 1.91 
Mean GBMER 4.80 4.17 
Mean Residuals -.112 -.058 
St. error reg. 6.05 7.13 
F(d. f. /s .1.) 9.21 (9,8/.3%) 5.59 (9,11/.5%) 
1977 ; 3-1978; 1 
Forecast Mean -13.4 -8.05 
Actual Mean 3.52 4.52 
Root MSE 18.79 13.55 
Theil U. 2.11 2.37. 
Note: The forecast values are corrected for autocorrelation using the in sample
estimate of RHO and the residual on the last observation. 
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forecast of the period of the IMF agreement is a decline of 6.6 percent 
in 1978; 2. For the following quarter a decline of -15.8 percent is 
predicted, when the fitted value was ~3.9 percent and there was an actual 
increase of 3.4 percent. 
Coming back to the estimation of equation (13) in the preceding section. 
the insignificance of foreign money and output variables in not too surpris-
ing, since the rate with the dollar will depend on trends with other trading 
partners. As for the capital gains and losses, they are not substantial in 
magnitude, relative to the current account, and insignificance is not particularly 
bothersome either. 
The insignificance of the constant, interpreted as the unreported 
current account is more puzzling, but nevertheless clear, as shown by the F 
tests on simultaneous restictions reported in Table 5. The tests including 
the constant in the first two rows have lower significance levels --a dif­
ference of 7 percent. Another restriction has to do with the construction 
of our exchange market pressure variable, which is suggested further by the 
similarity between the absolute value of the coefficients and the sign of 
the intervention variable. The restriction on the foreign flows are easily 
accepted, and the insignificance of the money stock may be justified by a 
* negligible gA. Whether the capital gains and the current account have the 
same coefficient or the former is zero is easily seen by the increase in 
significance level in the former case, by 13 percent when there is no constant. 
It therefore seems adequate to use the restricted regression where 
the rate of change in the black market rate depends positively on the current 
account, the official exchange market pressure, real domestic credit 
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Table 5 
Restrictions on the equation in Table 1 
Variable number 
(1) (2) 
C 26 29 18 25 23 22 F(d.f) s .1. F(d.f.) s.1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 .324 89 10.836 0 
(5,15) (4,20) 
0 1 -1 1 1 0 0 .661 66 3.376 
(5,15) (4,20) 0 
1 -1 1 1 0 0 • 740 58 7.337 .1 
(4,15) (5,19) 
0 1 1 0 0 .382 82 7.140 0 
(4, 15) (5,19) 
Note: In all tests the in homogeneous part is zero. Test in column (1) is on the 
restrictions being simultaneously true 
Test in column (2) is on the coefficients of the restricted regression being
different from zero. 
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creation, and negatively on the real official exchange rate and real 
output growths. The results are shown in Table 6, with and without auto-
2
correlation correction. The Durbin-Watson and the R from an identical 
equation where the residuals have zero mean are also reported. What is 
striking is the precision of the estimates even though we are now at at 
a lower confidence level. Again here autocorrelation is not so large as 
to justify using the corrected equation. In both cases, furthermore, 
the implied value of fA is -1.50 for OLS and -1.66 with the autocorrelation 
correction, which suggests that this is indeed a simplified equation where 
the constraint of no incremental foreign demand for domestic assets increases 
the possibility of dynamic instability in the foreign exchange market. 
Comparing the coefficients in the two panels of Table 6 with the 
unrestricted ones from Tables 1 and 2 above, we see that their size has 
generally decreased but is within the confidence interval. Thus the OLS 
effect of the current account in Table 1 was 5.7 whereas the value in the 
simplified version of Table 6, Panel I, is 4.2. The drop is not as large 
for'exchange market pressure'which has a coefficient of 2.8, down from 3.1 
to 3.5, for real output, 2.14 is absolute value, down from 2.5, or the real 
exchange rate, 2.1 down from 2.3. In the case of real domestic credit 
creation the coefficient remains unchanged at 2.5. 
The basic statistics of the simplified regression are similar to 
the ones above, whilst a clear increase in degrees of freedom allows for further 
forecasting experiments and provides,therefore, another justification for 





Variable Name Coefficient St. Error t Mean Aux. R2 
CABMR 4.24 1.05 4.03 -1. 35 .70
GOMFMB 2.81 .57 4.92 3.62 .92
ROCITM2 2.53 .57 4.43 .03 .60
GRUMEB 2.05 .62 -3.31 -.64 .90




STATISTICS R2 R2adj DW SER f (d.f./s.1.) 
.68 .62 2.29 6.98 10.8 (5,20)




26. CABMR 3.73 .96 3 .91 -1.699 .62
GOMFMB 2.58 .so 5.19 4.536 .89
24. RDCITM2 2.33 .51 4.56 .069 .56
29. GROMEB -1.82 .54 -3.38 -.802 .86
21. GIP -2.17 .61 -3.55 1.617 .37
RHO -.26 .04 
20. GBMER 3.585
RESIDUALS 
STATISTICS R2 R2 adj. DW 
.110 
SER F (d.f./s.l.) 
.68 .62 1.94 6.81 10.79 (4 ,20)




Plots of the restricted OLS estimates from Table 6 show very little 
difference with the unrestricted ones reported in Figure 1, except in 1973; 
3 and even more so in 1978;4, when the imposition of restrictions worsens 
the fit. In the first instance the unrestricted residual is about -10 
percent and the restricted residual goes up from 1 percent to 6.5 percent. 
The overall conformity of the two sets of estimates is, however, the 
remarkable consequence of the restrictions imposed. However, the 
OLS forecasts for the period of the crawling peg and of the agreement with 
the IMF, reported in Table 7, are significantly better in a mean square 
error sense than the ones of the unrestricted model. Thus the RMSE for 
1977;3-1979;1 drops to 5.46 (9.55 when aconstantis included) from 18.79 
and for 1978;2-1979;1 it drops to 6.84 (10.36 with a constant) from 15.42. 
The prediction errors for each observation are compared in Table 8 and 
the better forecasting performance of the restricted model is clear, in 
particular in 1978;4 when the restricted model had a much higher residual. 
As pointed out above, one advantage of the simplified 100del is 
that it increases the degrees of freedom. This allows a further test of 
the model's out-of-sample forcasting performance by the division of the 
sample into a period with a roughly fixed official exchange rate until the 
end of 1975 and a period with a depreciating official exchange rate there­
after. This division is somewhat arbitrary because in the second half 
or 1976 and after between February the 1977 devaluation and the adoption 
of the crawling peg the official effective exchange rate was virtually 
fixed, and also because the loss in reserves was quite substantial in the 
second period. In fact, the usual measure of the relative use of exchange 
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Table 7 
Forecasts from Table 5 
A B 
1973;1 - 1977;2 1973;1 - 1978;1 
CA.BMR 4.446 1.314 3.384 4.537 1.089 4.164 
GOMFMB 2.831 •674 4.200 2.915 .586 4.972
RDCITM2 2.460 .813 3.023 2.752 .595 4.621
GROMEB -2.086 .748 -2.790 -2.200 .639 -3.493
GIP -2.278 .849 -2.683 -2.391 .735 -3.253 
R2 with constant
(adj. for d.f.) •76 (.66) • 77 (.70) 
Alternative R2 . 715 •75 
D.W. (with constant) 2.62 (2.66) 2.54 (2.48) 
SER 7.74 7.08 
F (d.f.) 6.52 (5,13) 9.41 (5,16) 
s.l. •3% 0 
Residual Mean -1.32 -1.12 
Forecast Mean
(with constant) -.22 (-4.8) -1.21 (-4 .87) 
Actual Mean 3.52 4.52 
Root MSE
(with constant) 5.46 (9.55) 6.84 (10.36) 
Theil U




1977;3 1979;1 1978;1 1979;1 
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted 
1977;3 17.10 9.09 
4 10.36 4.94 
1978 ;l · 7.24 2.91 
2 20.23 14.08 17 .06 10.45 
3 28.33 14.13 19.23 3.41 
4 17.94 11.00 15.88 1.32 
1979;1 11.61 2.06 6.15 2.90 
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rate and intervention, obtained by taking the ratio of the proportional 
exchange rate changes and the change in foreign exchange reserves, scaled 
by the money supply valued at the official rate, is inadequate in this case 
because of the piling up of reserves and exchange rate appreciation in 1973. 
The foreign monetary base only started to decline in 1974;4, and the 
cumulative change since 1973;1 only became negative with the dip of 7.8 
percent in 1975;3. Despite these caveats, the division captures the 
essence of the adjustment process at 1 work. 
Table 9 reports the regressions for the two subperiods and it is 
evident that, except for the real exchange rate, and to some degree real 
output growth, the size of the effects of changes in asset stocks is 
vastly different in the two subperiods. Thus the effect of the current 
account is 2.54 for the "fixed rate" period, whilst it is 4.24 for the whole 
period. The size of the effect of exchange market pressure declines from 
2.70 to 1.91, but the overall effect is 2.81. Real domestic credit creation, 
on the other hand, has a small and insignificant effect in the first 
period and .n effect of 2. 2 in the second. Overall, the fit is better 
in the first period, but there is less autocorrelation in the residuals, 
in the second when the D.W. statistic is computed from a regression with 
a constant term. 
The out of sample performance of the model is, however, better in 
the second period. The RMSE is 10.2 percent versus 13.5 in the second 
period and Theil's U is .75 versus 1.50. 
Table 10 reports the residuals and the prediction errors of the 
regression over the whole sample period in column A, of the residual 
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Table 9 
Forecasts and Backcasts 
From Table 6 
A B 
1973;1 - 1975;4 1976;1 - 1979;1 
R2Coefficient St. Error t Mean Coefficient St. Error t Mean 
CABMR 2.54 1.75 1.45 -.37 .70 3.92 2.04 1.92-2.25 
GOMFMB 2.70 .6 7 4.01 1.02 .84 1.91 1.11 1. 71 6.02 
RDICTM2 .43 1.36 .32 -.28 .79 2.23 .80 2.79 •31 
GROMEB -1.33 .85 -1.58-2.43 .88 -1.27 1.13 -1.13 1.01 
GIP -.89 1.38 -.65 .59 .74 -.29 1.24 -.23 1.93 
GBMER 3.49 2.27 
RESIDUALS -.94 .75 
2R with constant (adj. d.f.) = .87 (.76) .75 (.56) 
R2 alt. .84 .73 
D.W. (with constant) 2.43 (2.35) 1.40 (1.83) 
SER 7.15 5.93 
F(d.f.) 7. 33 (5. 7) 4.40 (5.8) 
1.1 3.2 
1976;1 - 1979;1 1973;1 - 1975;4 
FORECAST MEAN 7.62 (6.77) 2.82 (4.86) 
ACTUAL 2.27 3.48 
ROOT MSE 13.51 (15.37) 10.19 (10. 99) 








Residuals Residuals/Prediction Errors Prediction Errors/Residuals
1973;1 -6.63 -2.95 -12.69
2 .98 7.09 -3.25
3 -12.51 -8.38 -19.64
4 -.79 -4.00 -5.51
1974; l 3.94 .92 4.42
2 -1.14 -6.86 5.62
3 5.44 4.06 14.04
4 -.73 1.61 1.68
1975;1 3.56 -1.72 8.31
2 -14.11 -10.10 -5.17
3 9.55 4. 71 17 .so
4 2.24 4.32 2.64
1976;1 ..,.10.25 -30.05 -6.92
2 -3.21 -3.39 -3.05
3 -7.28 -3.66 -1.88
4 5.03 -1.54 .16
1977;1 -5.37 -25.78 -1.28
2 3.01 -5.93 4.09
3 2.53 8.96 . 36
4 2 .31 11.61 .38
1978;1 -3.64 -18.90 -3.59
2 8.54 -5.47 12.23
3 7.23 8.99 5. 71
4 5.88 2.74 1.32
1979;1 -.69 -7 ,18 2.24 
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over the "fixed rate" period and the repective forecast in column Band 
of the residual over the "flexible rate" period and the respective back­
cast in Column C. It is clear that the forecast underestimated the 
change in the clack market rate whereas the backcast overestimated it. 
This is brought out by Figure 3 where the fitted values of the regression 
in Table 6 are plotted together with the in sample and outsample predictions 
of the regressions over the two subperiods. 
The poor out of sample behavior, when the sample is roughly divided 
into two subperiods, does suggest that the real shock and policy changes 
make forecasting quite hazardous, relative even to an imperfect in sample 
behavior. But what seems remarkable is rather how the severe data limita­
tions and structural changes do not prevent an in sample estimation of 
the rate of change of the black market rate in a simplified portfolio model. 
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Conclusion 
This may be the apropriate place to relate the main conclusion of 
the foregoing analysis, that the current account matters in the deter­
mination of the rate of change of the black market rate, to other findings 
about the Portuguese currency experience. Thus, it has been established 
that roughly one fifth of the variance of the change in the (official) 
effective exchange rate of the escudo could be explained by the current 
account and a constant and that a similar relationship held in real terms 
for the period 1936-1978. 8 It has also been shown that the official ef-
fective rate has moved according to relative purchasing power parity over 
the period 1973-19789 , even though the real effective rate increased in 
the first half of the period and declined in the second, and that nominal 
wages have been such that the effective exchange rate has a positive 
elasticity of .5 on the real unit labor costs relative to Portugal's main 
10trading partners. In all of these findings, the basic mechanism at work 
was not made explicit. Inconvertibility, on the one hand and non-traded 
goods and trade restrictions on the.other, made the "acceleration hypothesis" 
and "the law of one price" untenable in the Portuguese experience of 1973-78. 
Here the hypothesis is that, given asset demands, the stock of 
foreign assets of the private sector, as captured by the current account 
and intervention in the official market, determine together with domestic 
credit creation the rate of change in the black market exchange rate of 
the Portuguese escudo. Despite measurement problems and lack of reliable 
data on the relevant stock of foreign assets, the estimation of the model 
leads to the acceptance of the hypothesis. Furthermore, the results imply 
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that the private sector wishes to be a net debtor in foreign currency and 
therefore, that the current account is positively related to the black 
market rate, whereas intervention is negatively related to it. The 
exploration of the feedback from the black market rate to the reported 
current account and the inclusion of alternative assets to offset the 
large negative value of the propensity to hold foreign assets as real 
financial wealth increases are immediate extensions of the present work. 
Despite its limitations, the results show that the portfolio approach 
is not only relevant for almost perfectly flexible rates as Branson et 
al (1977) and (1978) and Porter (1978) have shown, but that it can also 




Sample period 1972;4-1979;1 
1. BMER End of period (last Thursday of quarter) bid black market 
exchange rate in escudos per dollar in Lisbon. Source International Reports. 
Comparison with other sources quoted in Macedo (1979f) suggested corrections 
in 1973;3 (IR value= 21.83), 1978;3 (IR value= 54.05) and 1979;1 (IR 
value= 46.95 ). The first and last cases implied implausibly high negative 
black market premia and the case of 1978;3 seems to be a typo of IR, because 
the values in the neighboring weeks are more plausible. 
2. OMEB End of period (last Thursday of quarter) bid official 
rate in escudos per dollar in New York. Source IR 
3. M2 Money including time deposits in billion escudos from IFS, 
lines 34 + 35. This value includes some savings deposits excluded from 
the BP definition. There is a break in the series in 1976;4 due to the 
revision of monetary statistics. 
4. CITINF Total domestic credit in billion escudoes, from IFS, 
lifies 32 until 1975;3 and adjusted-from the value in IFS after 1975;4. 
In that period IFS has a value which is implausibly higher (•434) and 
with no correspondence in the BP sources. After 1976;4 unrecoverable credits 
and estimates of BFN credit are netted out from BP data to maintain the 
earlier IFS definition. There may nevertheless still be a statistical 
break in this series. 
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5. NFABKSN Net foreign assets of the banking system in billion 
escudos from IFS, line 31. This series has been repeatedly revised in IFS 
and now corresponds to the BP definition. Only the central bank figure is 
adjusted for valuation changes due to the exchange rate. 
6. CPIEXH Lisbon consumer price index excluding housing from INEBM 
and BPBT, rebased 1973;1 • 1 , is much larger than the IFS figure, line 64 , 
which includes housing subject to rent control. 
7. NIPIX Industrial production-index, corrected for weekdays and 
seasonnally adjusted, from BPBT, rebased 1973;1 = 1. 
8. FAP Private stock of long term foreign assets. Series (13) 
cumulated with a base (the 1972; 4 value) from OECD balance of payments 
from 1960 to 1972. 
9. FLP Private stock of long term foreign liabilities. Series 
(14) cumulated as forseries 8 • 
10. NSFLP Net short term stock of foreign liabilities series (15) 
cumulated as for series (8). 
11. NCABDOL Current account balance, in millions of dollars, 1973;1 
- 1974;4 from RBP 1975 (figures in escudos converted at the average exchange 
rate) and from 1975;1 on from BTBP (figures in dollars). Differ from 
series (6) in Macedo'(J979a). 
12. NBNMT Balance on non-ronetary transactions, in million dollars. 
Same sources as series (11). 
' 
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13. LCOF Long term capital outflows of the private sector, in 
million dollars. Same source as series (11). The 1973 figures are not 
strictly comparable even with the 1974 figures because they rely 
on estimates of foreign direct investlllent and long term capital outflows 
alone. 
14. LCIF Long term capital inflows of the private sector, in 
million dollars, same source as series (13) 
15. NSCIF Net short term capital inflow, in million dollars, same 
source as series (13). Differ from the IFS data used in series (7) in 
Macedo (1979a). 
16. GCPOXH Rate of growth of series (6) in percent per quarter. 
17 GCPUS Rate of growth of U.S. consumer price index in percent 
per quarter.index based in 1975, from IFS, line 64. 
18. GOMEB Rate of growth of series (2) in percent per quarter. 
19. GROMEB Proportional rate of change in the real escudo dollar 
rate, in percent per quarter. Series (18) plus series (17) minus series 
(16). 
20. GBMER Rate of growth of series (1) in percent per quarter. 
21. GIP Rate of growth of series (7) in percent per quarter. 
22. GIPUS Rate of growth of U.S. industrial production index, in 




23. GRM2US Rate of growth of the real U.S. money stock, in per­
cent per quarter. U.S. money stock, (M2) from IFS lines 34 + 35. Series 
(17) is subtracted from the rate of growth of M2US. 
24. RDCITM2 Real domestic credit creation as a percentage or 
the money stock. Change in series (4) as a percentage of lagged value 
of series (3) divided by series (2) less series (16). 
25. FMBB "Foreign monetary base" as a proportion of the money 
supply, series (11) as a percentage of the lagged value of (3) in million 
escudos divided by series (2). 
26. GOMFMB Official exchange market pressure, in percent of the 
money supply. Series (18) minus series (25). 
27. CABMR Current account as a percentage of the money supply. 
Series (11) as a percentage of the lagged value of series (3) in million 
escudos divided by series (2). 
28. KLNFABK Net capital gains on the net stock of foreign assets 
of the banking system. Series (5) in million escudos divided by series 
(2) multiplied by series (17) in number per quarter, one period ahead. 
29. KLNFAM2 Net capital gains as a percentage of money stock. 
Series (28) as a percentage of the lagged value of series (3) in million 
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25.970 24.690 342.30 31)3.37 61.980
~6.61n 24.240 341.60 308.82 56.280
26.lRu 24.48() 3'51.03 322.76 55.72017 .;-i4q 27.490 364.56 335.83 47.780
38 .·4 70 27.300 3R5.50 359.80 38.810
?-2.2f.0 29.lAC' 389.31 3 70. 10 29.220
3 5. -•9~! 31.47fl 399.c:;5 390.70 17.610
34.48() 31.15() 420.47 412.60 17.690
35 -330 31.420 47l).68 459.70 13.600
3°.6sn 38.83(' 484.03 489.5V -1.0901139. -:po 38.820 513.19 522.9U -15.35045 •..·, 5('., 40. 79il 538.26 559.90 -24.580
4 7 .A21J 39.5·)0 578.64 60 7. 81) -22.860
41.lS" 41.140 6118.10 6l6.7u -34.050
45.45) 1+5. 74() 611.47 c43.lO -41.580
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Sr. 4PLE 1973. 1.-1q79. l • 
NUMRl::R '1F ')9SER_VAT!nNs = 25. 
NCA~DOt f') N~"'l••f~ " LC 'JI= 0 LC IF 0 NSCIF (l 
1973. 1 • 2J'1.f'I"\ 8 2 • 1) (l:, 32 •(Hi,) 41 .l.ll-lJ -152. 0i'l 
1973. 2. 183.()11 11 .n,)1, 411.01"·) 47.00LI -13.000 
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Kouri (1978) has a partial equilibrium model of two-way currency 
substitution. Inflation is briefly discussed on pp. 38-39. 
2
See the discussion of the restrictions on these functions in 
Tobin (1969) and Tobin-Macedo (1979). 
3See evidence on this hypothesis in Macedo (1979d). 
4The term is borrowed from Girton-Roper (1977). 
5See Macedo (1979b) for a model along these lines. 
6See a critical review of these models in Macedo 
(1979b). 
7In Macedo (1979a, Sec. III. 3) the level of the black market premium 
was regressed on domestic money and the net stock of foreign assets of 
the private sector obtained by cumulating the short term capital account and 
errors and omissions (similar to series 15 in the Appendix). This stock, which 
was negative over the whole sample period, cannot, however, be taken to 
reveal that there was borrowing in foreign currency, so that the assump-
tion of no foreign demand for domestic assets had to be made. As the sum 
of series (13) and (14) in the Appendix shows, the level of long term 
gross investment in Portugal is sizable and the fact that the value is 
negative when the short term account is properly measured suggests that 
the capital mobility is indeed larger than 100st people anticipated. Similar 
emphasis on the Portuguese capital account can be found in Barbosa-Beleza 
(1979). 
52 
8 See Macedo (1979cr 
9 S~e Macedo (1979e)• 
10 
See Krugman-Macedo (1S79) and Macedo (1979g). 
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